

## “The Missiles of October”: The Cuban Missile Crisis

Student Name \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

### Activity #1: The Discovery of the Missiles

**Directions:** Reconnaissance flights have detected the presence of Soviet-made Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) in Cuba. As an analyst for the CIA, your job is to write a memorandum explaining to President Kennedy why these missiles are a threat.

First, read the following statement on Cuba, which Kennedy made on September 4, 1962:

<http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/jfkstate.htm>

Next, study the following documents, which you will use to write your memorandum.

Document 1: Briefing Paper, October 1, 1962

<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/forrel/cuba/cuba001.htm>

Document 2: Map of Cuba used during President’s meetings with political and military advisers:

[http://www.jfklibrary.org/jfkl/cmc/cmc\\_cubamap.jpg](http://www.jfklibrary.org/jfkl/cmc/cmc_cubamap.jpg)

Document 3: U-2 Photograph of a truck convoy approaching a deployment of Soviet Medium Range Ballistic Missiles near Los Palacios at San Cristobal:

[http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba\\_mis\\_cri/14.jpg](http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/14.jpg)

Document 4: Medium Range Ballistic Missile Field Launch Site, San Cristobal No. 1, 14 October 1962:

[http://www.jfklibrary.org/jfkl/cmc/cmc\\_u2\\_photo.jpg](http://www.jfklibrary.org/jfkl/cmc/cmc_u2_photo.jpg)

Document 5: CIA Briefing board for JFK showing range of Soviet Medium Range Ballistic Missiles:

[http://www.jfklibrary.org/jfkl/cmc/cmc\\_map\\_missile\\_range.jpg](http://www.jfklibrary.org/jfkl/cmc/cmc_map_missile_range.jpg)

Document 6: CIA reference photograph of Soviet Medium Range Ballistic Missile (SS-4) in Red Square, Moscow:

[http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba\\_mis\\_cri/16.jpg](http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/16.jpg)

Document 7: Off-the-Record Meeting on Cuba, October 16, 1962: <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/transci2.htm>

[National Security Advisor MacGeorge] Bundy: But, the...question that I would like to ask is, quite aside from what we've said, what is the strategic impact on the position of the United States of M[edium] R[ange] B[allistic] M[issile]s in Cuba? How gravely does this change the strategic balance?

[Secretary of Defense Robert] McNamara: I asked the [Joint] Chiefs [of Staff] that this afternoon, in effect. And they said, substantially. My own personal view is, not at all.

Bundy: Not so much....

JFK: I will say, my understanding's that [...] let's just say that...they get these in there and then...they get sufficient capacity so we...don't want to knock 'em out [because]...there's too much of a gamble. Then they just begin to build up those air bases there and then put more and more.... Then they start getting ready to squeeze us in Berlin.... You may say it doesn't make any difference if you get blown up by an ICBM [Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile] flying from the Soviet Union or one that was ninety miles away. Geography doesn't mean that much.

[Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Maxwell] Taylor: We'd have to target them with our missiles and have the same kind of, of pistol-pointed-at-the-head situation as we have in the Soviet Union at the present time....

RFK [Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy]: Of course, the other problem is...in South America a year from now. And the fact that you got...these things in the hands of Cubans, here, and then...some problem arises in Venezuela...you've got [Cuban leader Fidel] Castro saying, You move troops down into that part of Venezuela, we're going to fire these missiles....

JFK: It makes them look like they're coequal with us and that...

[Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas] Dillon: We're scared of the Cubans....

[Assistant Secretary of State Edwin M.] Martin: It's a psychological factor. It won't reach as far as Venezuela is concerned....

McNamara: It'll reach the U.S. though. This is the point.

Dillon: Yeah. That is the point....

Martin: Well, it's a psychological factor that we have sat back and let 'em do it to us, that is more important than the direct threat....

JFK: ...I said we weren't going to [tolerate Soviet missiles in Cuba].... Last month I said we weren't going to.... Last month I should have said...that we don't care. But when we said we're not going to and then they go ahead and do it, and then we do nothing, then...I would think that our risks increase.... What difference does it make? They've got enough to blow us up now anyway.... [T]his is a political struggle as much as military....

Martin: I would say this, Mr. President, that if you've made a public statement, you've got to move immediately, or you're going to have a [words unintelligible] in this country.

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### Activity #1: The Discovery of the Missiles

#### Glossary of Technical Terms:

**ICBM:** An acronym for “Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile,” a weapon designed for use against enemy cities and other stationary targets. ICBMs typically had a range of more than 3,500 miles, so that if launched from the Soviet Union they could reach targets in the United States, and vice versa. By the 1960s both the United States and the Soviet Union had large numbers of these weapons armed with nuclear warheads, thus leading to fears that much of the civilized world would be destroyed if war between the two powers ever broke out.

**IL-28:** A Soviet jet bomber built by Ilyushin, a bureau of the Soviet Government responsible for building military aircraft for the Soviet Union. First entering production in 1948, the IL-28 saw widespread use in many conflicts, since the Soviet Union exported large numbers of these to friendly powers around the world. This aircraft was considered one of the most successful of the Ilyushin models, and remained in service in the Soviet air force well into the 1980s.

**MiG-15, 17, 19 and 21:** MiG, short for Mikoyan-Gurevich, was the arm of the Soviet Government responsible for producing jet fighter aircraft for the Soviet Union. The numbers indicate a particular aircraft design; of these four, the MiG-15 was the oldest, first entering service in 1948, and was largely obsolete by the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The MiG-21, on the other hand, represented the state of the art in Soviet aircraft design, and was still being used as late as the 1980s.

**MRBM:** An acronym for “medium-range ballistic missile,” a weapon designed for use against enemy cities. The Soviet MRBM’s detected in Cuba were SS-4s.

**SAM:** An acronym for “surface-to-air missile,” a weapon designed for use against enemy aircraft. The Soviet SAMs detected in Cuba were SA-2s.

**SA-2:** The name used by the United States and its allies for what the Soviets called the S-75, the most widely used surface-to-air missile (SAM) in history. First deployed in 1957, these missiles were exported to virtually every country friendly to the Soviet Union, particularly to East Germany. These weapons were capable of striking aircraft at very high altitudes, and in 1960 had been used to bring down a U.S. reconnaissance plane over the Soviet Union.

**SS-4 “Shyster” (aka “Sandal”):** The name used by the United States and its allies for what the Soviets called the R-12, a medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) that first entered service in 1959. With an effective range of over 1000 nautical miles, an SS-4 launched from Cuba was capable of reaching targets as far away as Cincinnati, Ohio, and San Antonio, Texas.

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### Activity #2: Days of Decision

**Directions:** Play the interactive simulation located at <http://www.teachingamericanhistory.org/neh/interactives/cubanmissilecrisis/>. Start by examining the five options you have available for responding to the Soviet missiles in Cuba—you will find these in the upper left-hand corner. Then move the mouse over the photograph in the upper right. As names of your advisers appear click on them and see what they have to say about the various options. Record their advice on the chart below.

Adviser	What option does this person favor, and why?	What options does he specifically reject, and why?
Secretary of State Dean Rusk		
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara		
Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Maxwell Taylor		

National Security Advisor MacGeorge Bundy		
Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon		
CIA Director John McCone		
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy		

Next click on the tab labeled “Special Intelligence Estimate” to get a report prepared by the CIA on this question. After you have read the report, choose one of the five options in the upper left-hand corner. In the space below indicate why you have made this choice.

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### Activity #3: Kennedy’s “Quarantine” Speech

**Directions:** President Kennedy gave a critical address to the American people on October 22, 1962. Using the following excerpts from that speech, answer the questions below. The speech can be read in its entirety, or listened to, at <http://www.jfklibrary.org/j102262.htm>.

This Government, as promised, has maintained the closest surveillance of the Soviet Military buildup on the island of Cuba. Within the past week, unmistakable evidence has established the fact that a series of offensive missile sites is now in preparation on that imprisoned island. The purpose of these bases can be none other than to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere....

This urgent transformation of Cuba into an important strategic base—by the presence of these large, long range, and clearly offensive weapons of sudden mass destruction—constitutes an explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas, in flagrant and deliberate defiance of the Rio Pact of 1947, the traditions of this Nation and hemisphere, the joint resolution of the 87th Congress, the Charter of the United Nations, and my own public warnings to the Soviets on September 4 and 13. This action also contradicts the repeated assurances of Soviet spokesmen, both publicly and privately delivered, that the arms buildup in Cuba would retain its original defensive character, and that the Soviet Union had no need or desire to station strategic missiles on the territory of any other nation....

Neither the United States of America nor the world community of nations can tolerate deliberate deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, large or small. We no longer live in a world where only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation's security to constitute maximum peril. Nuclear weapons are so destructive and ballistic missiles are so swift, that any substantially increased possibility of their use or any sudden change in their deployment may well be regarded as a definite threat to peace.

For many years both the Soviet Union and the United States, recognizing this fact, have deployed strategic nuclear weapons with great care, never upsetting the precarious status quo which insured that these weapons would not be used in the absence of some vital challenge. Our own strategic missiles have never been transferred to the territory of any other nation under a cloak of secrecy and deception; and our history—unlike that of the Soviets since the end of World War II—demonstrates that we have no desire to dominate or conquer any other nation or impose our system upon its people. Nevertheless, American citizens have become adjusted to living daily on the Bull's-eye of Soviet missiles located inside the U.S.S.R. or in submarines.

In that sense, missiles in Cuba add to an already clear and present danger—although it should be noted the nations of Latin America have never previously been subjected to a potential nuclear threat.

But this secret, swift, and extraordinary buildup of Communist missiles—in an area well known to have a special and historical relationship to the United States and the nations of the Western Hemisphere, in violation of Soviet assurances, and in defiance of American and hemispheric policy—this sudden, clandestine decision to station strategic weapons for the first time outside of Soviet soil—is a deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the status quo which cannot be accepted by this country, if our courage and our commitments are ever to be trusted again by either friend or foe.

The 1930s taught us a clear lesson: aggressive conduct, if allowed to go unchecked and unchallenged ultimately leads to war. This nation is opposed to war. We are also true to our word. Our unswerving objective, therefore, must be to prevent the use of these missiles against this or any other country, and to secure their withdrawal or elimination from the Western Hemisphere.

Our policy has been one of patience and restraint, as befits a peaceful and powerful nation, which leads a worldwide alliance. We have been determined not to be diverted from our central concerns by mere irritants and fanatics. But now further action is required—and it is under way; and these actions may only be the beginning. We will not prematurely or unnecessarily risk the costs of worldwide nuclear war in which even the fruits of victory would be ashes in our mouth—but neither will we shrink from that risk at any time it must be faced.

Acting, therefore, in the defense of our own security and of the entire Western Hemisphere, and under the authority entrusted to me by the Constitution as endorsed by the resolution of the Congress, I have directed that the following initial steps be taken immediately:

First: To halt this offensive buildup, a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba is being initiated. All ships of any kind bound for Cuba from whatever nation or port will, if found to contain cargoes of offensive weapons, be turned back. This quarantine will be extended, if needed, to other types of cargo and carriers. We are not at this time, however, denying the necessities of life as the Soviets attempted to do in their Berlin blockade of 1948....

Third: It shall be the policy of this Nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.

Fourth: As a necessary military precaution, I have reinforced our base at Guantanamo, evacuated today the dependents of our personnel there, and ordered additional military units to be on a standby alert basis....

Sixth: Under the Charter of the United Nations, we are asking tonight that an emergency meeting of the Security Council be convoked without delay to take action against this latest Soviet threat to world peace. Our resolution will call for the prompt dismantling and withdrawal of all offensive weapons in Cuba, under the supervision of U.N. observers, before the quarantine can be lifted.

Seventh and finally: I call upon Chairman Khrushchev to halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless and provocative threat to world peace and to stable relations between our two nations. I call upon him further to abandon this course of world domination, and to join in an historic effort to end the perilous arms race and to transform the history of man. He has an opportunity now to move the world back from the abyss of destruction—by returning to his government's own words that it had no need to station missiles outside its own territory, and withdrawing these weapons from Cuba—by refraining from any

action which will widen or deepen the present crisis—and then by participating in a search for peaceful and permanent solutions.

My fellow citizens: let no one doubt that this is a difficult and dangerous effort on which we have set out. No one can see precisely what course it will take or what costs or casualties will be incurred. Many months of sacrifice and self-discipline lie ahead—months in which our patience and our will will be tested—months in which many threats and denunciations will keep us aware of our dangers. But the greatest danger of all would be to do nothing.

The path we have chosen for the present is full of hazards, as all paths are—but it is the one most consistent with our character and courage as a nation and our commitments around the world. The cost of freedom is always high—and Americans have always paid it. And one path we shall never choose, and that is the path of surrender or submission.

Our goal is not the victory of might, but the vindication of right—not peace at the expense of freedom, but both peace and freedom, here in this hemisphere, and, we hope, around the world. God willing, that goal will be achieved.

Question	Answer
What, according to Kennedy, was the purpose of the missile sites in Cuba?	
Why, according to Kennedy, did the presence of the missiles pose a threat to the United States?	
Kennedy referred to the 1930s. To what was he referring and, more importantly, what was to be learned from it?	
Kennedy's first action was to institute a "strict quarantine." What did he mean by this?	
What other steps did Kennedy plan to take?	



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### Activity #4: Resolving the Crisis

Directions: Read the following correspondence, which took place between Kennedy and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev between October 22 and 28, 1962. Based on your reading, be prepared to answer the following in class discussion:

- What did Kennedy agree to do to end the crisis?
- What did Khrushchev agree to do to end the crisis?
- On balance, do you think either side “won” in the end? If so, which one, and why?

1. From a Letter from President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev, October 22, 1962:

<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/forrel/cuba/cuba044.htm>

In our discussions and exchanges on Berlin and other international questions, the one thing that has most concerned me has been the possibility that your Government would not correctly understand the will and determination of the United States in any given situation, since I have not assumed that you or any other sane man would, in this nuclear age, deliberately plunge the world into war which it is crystal clear no country could win and which could only result in catastrophic consequences to the whole world, including the aggressor...

It was in order to avoid any incorrect assessment on the part of your Government with respect to Cuba that I publicly stated that if certain developments in Cuba took place, the United States would do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies.

...Despite this, the rapid development of long-range missile bases and other offensive weapons systems in Cuba has proceeded. I must tell you that the United States is determined that this threat to the security of this hemisphere be removed. At the same time, I wish to point out that the action we are taking is the minimum necessary to remove the threat to the security of the nations of this hemisphere. The fact of this minimum response should not be taken as a basis, however, for any misjudgment on your part.

I hope that your Government will refrain from any action which would widen or deepen this already grave crisis and that we can agree to resume the path of peaceful negotiation.

2. From a Letter from Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, October 24, 1962:

<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/forrel/cuba/cuba061.htm>

You, Mr. President, are not declaring a quarantine, but rather are setting forth an ultimatum and threatening that if we do not give in to your demands you will use force. Consider what you are saying!

And you want to persuade me to agree to this! What would it mean to agree to these demands? It would mean guiding oneself in one's relations with other countries not by reason, but by submitting to arbitrariness. You are no longer appealing to reason, but wish to intimidate us....

The Soviet Government considers that the violation of the freedom to use international waters and international air space is an act of aggression which pushes mankind toward the abyss of a world nuclear-missile war. Therefore, the Soviet Government cannot instruct the captains of Soviet vessels bound for Cuba to observe the orders of American naval forces blockading that Island. Our instructions to Soviet mariners are to observe strictly the universally accepted norms of navigation in international waters and not to retreat one step from them. And if the American side violates these rules, it must realize what responsibility will rest upon it in that case. Naturally we will not simply be bystanders with regard to piratical acts by American ships on the high seas. We will then be forced on our part to take the measures we consider necessary and adequate in order to protect our rights. We have everything necessary to do so.

3. From a Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union, October 25, 1962: <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/forrel/cuba/cuba068.htm>

I have received your letter of October 24, and I regret very much that you still do not appear to understand what it is that has moved us in this matter.

The sequence of events is clear. In August there were reports of important shipments of military equipment and technicians from the Soviet Union to Cuba. In early September I indicated very plainly that the United States would regard any shipment of offensive weapons as presenting the gravest issues. After that time, this Government received the most explicit assurance from your Government and its representatives, both publicly and privately, that no offensive weapons were being sent to Cuba....

In reliance on these solemn assurances I urged restraint upon those in this country who were urging action in this matter at that time. And then I learned beyond doubt what you have not denied--namely, that all these public assurances were false and that your military people had set out recently to establish a set of missile bases in Cuba. I ask you to recognize clearly, Mr. Chairman, that it was not I who issued the first challenge in this case, and that in the light of this record these activities in Cuba required the responses I have announced.

I repeat my regret that these events should cause a deterioration in our relations. I hope that your Government will take the necessary action to permit a restoration of the earlier situation.

4. From a Telegram from the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State, October 26, 1962: <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/forrel/cuba/cuba084.htm>

You have now proclaimed piratical measures, which were employed in the Middle Ages, when ships proceeding in international waters were attacked, and you have called this "a quarantine" around Cuba. Our vessels, apparently, will soon enter the zone which your Navy is patrolling. I assure you that these vessels, now bound for Cuba, are carrying the most innocent peaceful cargoes. Do you really think that we only occupy ourselves with the carriage of so-called offensive weapons, atomic and hydrogen bombs? Although perhaps your military people imagine that these [cargoes] are some sort of special type of weapon, I assure you that they are the most ordinary peaceful products.

Consequently, Mr. President, let us show good sense. I assure you that on those ships, which are bound for Cuba, there are no weapons at all. The weapons which were necessary for the defense of Cuba are already there. I do not want to say that there were not any shipments of weapons at all. No, there were such shipments. But now Cuba has already received the necessary means of defense.

I don't know whether you can understand me and believe me. But I should like to have you believe in yourself and to agree that one cannot give way to passions; it is necessary to control them. And in what direction are events now developing? If you stop the vessels, then, as you yourself know, that would be piracy. If we started to do that with regard to your ships, then you would also be as indignant as we and the whole world now are. One cannot give another interpretation to such actions, because one cannot legalize lawlessness. If this were permitted, then there would be no peace, there would also be no peaceful coexistence. We should then be forced to put into effect the necessary measures of a defensive character to protect our interest in accordance with international law. Why should this be done? To what would all this lead? [...]

If assurances were given by the President and the Government of the United States that the USA itself would not participate in an attack on Cuba and would restrain others from actions of this sort, if you would recall your fleet, this would immediately change everything. I am not speaking for Fidel Castro, but I think that he and the Government of Cuba, evidently, would declare demobilization and would appeal to the people to get down to peaceful labor. Then, too, the question of armaments would disappear, since, if there is no threat, then armaments are a burden for every people. Then, too, the question of the destruction, not only of the armaments which you call offensive, but of all other armaments as well, would look different....

Let us therefore show statesmanlike wisdom. I propose: we, for our part, will declare that our ships, bound for Cuba, are not carrying any armaments. You would declare that the United States will not invade Cuba with its forces and will not support any sort of forces which might intend to carry out an invasion of Cuba. Then the necessity for the presence of our military specialists in Cuba would disappear.

Mr. President, I appeal to you to weigh well what the aggressive, piratical actions, which you have declared the USA intends to carry out in international waters, would lead to. You yourself know that any sensible man simply cannot agree with this, cannot recognize your right to such actions.

If you did this as the first step towards the unleashing of war, well then, it is evident that nothing else is left to us but to accept this challenge of yours. If, however, you have not lost your self-control and sensibly conceive what this might lead to, then, Mr. President, we and you ought not now to pull on the ends of the rope in which you have tied the knot of war, because the more the two of us pull, the tighter that knot will be tied. And a moment may come when that knot will be tied so tight that even he who tied it will not have the strength to untie it, and then it will be necessary to cut that knot. And what that would mean is not for me to explain to you, because you yourself understand perfectly of what terrible forces our countries dispose.”

5. From a Message from Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, October 26, 1962:  
<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/forrel/cuba/cuba091.htm>

You are disturbed over Cuba. You say that this disturbs you because it is 90 miles by sea from the coast of the United States of America. But Turkey adjoins us; our sentries patrol back and forth and see each other. Do you consider, then, that you have the right to demand security for your own country and the removal of the weapons you call offensive, but do not accord the same right to us? You have placed destructive missile weapons, which you call offensive, in Turkey, literally next to us. How then can recognition of our equal military capacities be reconciled with such unequal relations between our great states? This is irreconcilable....

I therefore make this proposal: We are willing to remove from Cuba the means which you regard as offensive. We are willing to carry this out and to make this pledge in the United Nations. Your representatives will make a declaration to the effect that the United States, for its part, considering the uneasiness and anxiety of the Soviet State, will remove its analogous means from Turkey. Let us reach agreement as to the period of time needed by you and by us to bring this about. And, after that, persons entrusted by the United Nations Security Council could inspect on the spot the fulfillment of the pledges made....

We, in making this pledge, in order to give satisfaction and hope of the peoples of Cuba and Turkey and to strengthen their confidence in their security, will make a statement within the framework of the Security Council to the effect that the Soviet Government gives a solemn promise to respect the inviolability of the borders and sovereignty of Turkey, not to interfere in its internal affairs, not to invade Turkey, not to make available our territory as a bridgehead for such an invasion, and that it would also restrain those who contemplate committing aggression against Turkey, either from the territory of the Soviet Union or from the territory of Turkey's other neighboring states.

The United States Government will make a similar statement within the framework of the Security Council regarding Cuba. It will declare that the United States will respect the inviolability of Cuba's borders and its sovereignty, will pledge not to interfere in its internal affairs, not to invade Cuba itself or make its territory available as a bridgehead for such an invasion, and will also restrain those who might contemplate committing aggression against Cuba, either from the territory of the United States or from the territory of Cuba's other neighboring states....

6. From a Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union, October 27, 1962: <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/forrel/cuba/cuba095.htm>

I have read your letter of October 26 with great care and welcomed the statement of your desire to seek a prompt solution to the problem. The first thing that needs to be done, however, is for work to cease on offensive missile bases in Cuba and for all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use to be rendered inoperable, under effective United Nations arrangements.

Assuming this is done promptly, I have given my representatives in New York instructions that will permit them to work out this week and—in cooperation with the Acting Secretary General and your representative—an arrangement for a permanent solution to the Cuban problem along the lines suggested in your letter of October 26. As I read your letter, the key elements of your proposals—which seem generally acceptable as I understand them—are as follows:

1. You would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision; and undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.

2. We, on our part, would agree—upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments—(a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba and I am confident that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise.

If you will give your representative similar instructions, there is no reason why we should not be able to complete these arrangements and announce them to the world within a couple of days. The effect of such a settlement on easing world tensions would enable us to work toward a more general arrangement regarding "other armaments", as proposed in your second letter which you made public....

But the first ingredient, let me emphasize, is the cessation of work on missile sites in Cuba and measures to render such weapons inoperable, under effective international guarantees. The continuation of this threat, or a prolonging of this discussion concerning Cuba by linking these problems to the broader questions of European and world security, would surely lead to an intensification of the Cuban crisis and a grave risk to the peace of the world. For this reason I hope we can quickly agree along the lines outlined in this letter and in your letter of October 26.

7. From a Message from Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, October 28, 1962:

<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/forrel/cuba/cuba102.htm>

I regard with respect and trust the statement you made in your message of October 27, 1962, that there would be no attack, no invasion of Cuba, and not only on the part of the United States, but also on the part of other nations of the Western Hemisphere, as you said in your same message. Then the motives which induced us to render assistance of such a kind to Cuba disappear.

It is for this reason that we instructed our officers—these means as I had already informed you earlier are in the hands of the Soviet officers—to take appropriate measures to discontinue construction of the aforementioned facilities, to dismantle them, and to return them to the Soviet Union....